

Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981–2014

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Abstract

We develop the first cross-nationally comparable, survey-based measures of policy ideology in the European mass public. Our estimates cover eighteen Western European countries across thirty-three years and three policy domains: economic, social/postmaterial, and immigration/nationalism. We construct them using over one million individual survey responses and a Bayesian group-level IRT model. We show that political conflict in Europe now takes place across three distinct (but correlated) dimensions, and that ideologies have become polarized by region. Northern European countries are generally more conservative economically, but more liberal on social issues and immigration, while Southern European countries are the opposite. Over time, almost all countries have become more liberal on social issues, but Northern countries have done so much faster, while ideology on the economic and immigration domains has changed more slowly. Our new measures will enable scholars to address a wide variety of questions on democratic politics in Western Europe.

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1 Introduction

How do citizens' policy preferences vary across countries? How have they changed over time? What are the sources of these ideological differences? How do mass preferences affect electoral and policy outcomes? Which political institutions inhibit or enhance government responsiveness to citizens' preferences? Such questions lie at the heart of the field of European politics and of political science more generally. To study them, scholars require measures of mass policy preferences that can be compared across countries and over time. Despite decades of cross-national survey research in Europe, however, measures that meet these standards remain elusive. The key problem that has so far prevented their development is a lack of survey questions repeated consistently across years and European countries.

As a consequence, cross-national research on representation and related topics in European politics has instead relied on indirect proxies for mass policy preferences. By far the most common of these proxies are, first, the average citizen's self-placement on a left-right scale (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Huber 1989) and, second, the left-right location of the median voter as inferred from the ideological scores of party manifestos (Kim and Fording 1998; De Neve 2011; see also Budge et al. 2001). The development of these measures was an understandable response to the limitations of existing data and statistical methods, and many excellent and influential studies of the role of mass ideology in European politics would hardly have been possible without them. With these measures, scholars have examined such central issues as governments' ideological congruence with the mass public (Huber and Powell 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1997; McDonald and Budge 2005), their responsiveness to ideological shifts in the public's preferences (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al. 2010), and how these relationships are mediated by electoral rules and institutions (Powell 2000; Blais and Bodet 2006; Powell 2009; Golder and Stramski 2010; Kang and Powell 2010; Ferland 2016).

But as even many scholars that use them admit, these proxies are not ideal measures of citizens' policy preferences per se. Left–right self-placement can depend greatly on political context, imperiling comparison across countries and time, and like other measures of ideological identification is often driven as much by partisan and symbolic attachments as by “operational” policy preferences (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Miller 1992; Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Ellis and Stimson 2012). For their part, median-voter scores hinge on assumptions about party manifesto scores' comparability across countries and the primacy of left–right ideology in determining voters' partisan choices, thus sometimes begging the very questions that we wish to answer (Kim and Fording 1998, 76–7; for a critique, see Warwick and Zakharova 2012). Moreover, both of these proxies presume that ideological variation in Europe takes place along a single left–right dimension, an assumption that, however plausible in earlier eras, is called into question by the increasing salience of political conflict over non-economic issues (Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Knutsen 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006). There is, in short, a clear need for summary measures of mass ideology that are derived directly from citizens' policy preferences, can be compared across time and countries, and reflect the increasingly multidimensional character of European politics.

This article introduces measures of mass ideology in European publics designed to meet this need. Taking advantage of recent advances in ideological scaling methods, we estimate the domain-specific policy conservatism of men and women in eighteen Western European countries in each biennium between 1981–82 and 2013–14. Specifically, we apply a dynamic group-level item response theory (DGIRT) model (McGann 2014; Caughey and Warshaw 2015) to a comprehensive dataset of multi-country public opinion surveys, estimating conservatism separately for economic, social/postmaterial, and immigration/nationalism issues. Because the DGIRT model estimates conservatism at the level of population groups rather than individuals, it surmounts the problem of sparse and uneven question availability that has until now stymied the creation of dynamic, cross-national measures of policy ideology in

Europe. It thus allows us to paint a rich new portrait of the policy preferences of European mass publics across multiple issue dimensions.

While most of our findings are consistent with previous survey research on issue-specific attitudes, many diverge sharply from the ideological patterns implied by self-placement or median-voter scores. According to our conservatism estimates, the European public as a whole has shifted markedly to the left on social issues, but has changed comparatively little on economic or immigration issues. Cross-sectionally, we find that men have always been substantially more conservative than women on economic issues, but not on immigration or (until recently) social issues. On all three domains we find a strong north–south, rich–poor gradient in cross-country opinion. In Northern Europe, citizens tend to be relatively conservative on economics but progressive on immigration and social issues, whereas Southern Europeans tend to be conservative on immigration and social issues but not on economics. Across countries, then, economic conservatism has a strong negative correlation with social and immigration conservatism (which are positively correlated with each other), indicating that a single left–right dimension cannot capture cross-national ideological variation in Europe. In line with this implication, we find that self-placement and median-voter scores are at best weakly associated with domain-specific policy conservatism (as well as with each other).

To demonstrate the validity of our measures of policy conservatism, we show that they have a strong cross-sectional correlation with responses to highly ideological survey questions in their respective domains. They also track within-country dynamic measures of public “mood” in the nations where it has been estimated, Great Britain and France (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011; Stimson, Thiébaud, and Tiberj 2012). We also evaluate the relationship between mass conservatism and government policies in a given domain. Cross-sectionally, mass-level social progressivism strongly predicts the strength of countries’ gay rights policies, and progressivism on immigration does so on pro-immigrant

policies. Moreover, within-country, variation in economic progressivism predicts variation in welfare generosity. Notably, our conservatism scores predict each of these policy outcomes better than self-placement and median-voter scores do. Overall, we conclude that the ideological constructs measured by our mass conservatism scores are both substantially important and fundamentally distinct from those measured by self-placement and median-voter scores.

2 Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics

The correspondence between citizens' preferences and government policies lies at the core of normative justifications for democracy, if not its very definition, and is thus a central concern of comparative politics (Dahl 1989; May 1978; for an empirical review, see Powell 2004). Scholars of European politics, site of many of the world's longest-standing democracies, have accordingly developed a rich literature on the content and structure of mass policy preferences. While much of this research has focused on particular issue domains or even individual survey questions, citizens' specific attitudes are typically presumed to be structured along one or more ideological dimensions rooted in divergent interests and values.

The cleavage over the distribution of economic resources has always played a central role in structuring ideological conflict and party competition in Europe. Since the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), however, the literature on parties and mass behavior has recognized "the importance of alternative, 'second' dimensions of political conflict" over religion and other cultural issues (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, 202). These two main ideological dimensions, typically labeled *economic* and *cultural*, have endured or even been reinforced by the rise of new issues such as environmentalism and gay rights, with their content evolving over time as new issues arise (e.g., Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt 1994). One possible exception to this pattern is the recent emergence of issues of national identity,

particularly as related to immigration, which some scholars argue has now become a distinct third dimension of political conflict (Heath et al. 1999; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; but see Kriesi et al. 2006).

The content and relative importance of these ideological dimensions has varied across time and countries. As Inglehart (1990) argues, the increasing salience of “postmaterialist” concerns has been tied to rising levels of wealth in Western Europe. Younger generations, socialized in more affluent circumstances, have placed greater emphasis on postmaterialist values and have tended to be more left-libertarian than their forebears (Inglehart 1985; Kriesi 1998, 174–6). Moreover, even within Western Europe, postmaterialism has emerged at different rates across countries depending on their level of economic development. For this and other reasons, scholars have found substantial ideological variation in issue attitudes across European publics, with much of the cross-national variation falling along north–south, rich–poor lines.

On economic issues, the publics of Southern European countries have generally been found to be more left-wing than their Northern European counterparts. Bonoli (2000), for example, shows that Southern Europe, along with France, stands out as particularly supportive of measures of support for government intervention in the economy. Similarly, Papadakis and Bean (1993) and Kenworthy and McCall (2008) find Italians to be more supportive of economic redistribution than Northern European publics. Paradoxically, there is at best mixed evidence that the generosity of European welfare states is positively correlated with mass support for economic redistribution, government provision of social benefits, or related issue positions (Jaeger 2006). In particular, Scandinavians, despite enjoying arguably the most generous welfare states in the world, are less supportive of redistributive policies than Germans, Austrians, and other Central Europeans (Svallfors 2003; Jaeger 2009).

The cross-national patterns on cultural and postmaterial issues are the reverse of economics. On the whole, research on these issues has found that Northern European countries

are the most socially progressive and Southern European countries are the most conservative. On gender issues, for example, a small set of countries have highly egalitarian views: the Scandinavian countries plus the Netherlands. Southern European countries are the most traditional, with other countries in the middle, but generally closer to the conservative rather than socially liberal end of the spectrum (Treas and Widmer 2000; Sjöberg 2004). Likewise, studies of support for gay rights find a clear north–south income gradient across countries. Most European countries saw big rises in support for gay rights over the period we examine, with the Scandinavian countries (excluding Finland) and the Netherlands showing the biggest rises. By contrast, as aside from Spain, Southern European countries did not see substantial rises in support and remain quite opposed to homosexuality. Greece and Portugal stand out as particularly conservative (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Akker, Ploeg, and Scheepers 2013). Environmental issues exhibit similar cross-national patterns (Inglehart 1995; Franzen and Vogl 2013).

As noted above, some scholars have advocated treating immigration and related issues of national identity as a distinct ideological dimension. Multi-nation survey research of immigration has been comparatively rare, but what work exists finds cross-country patterns similar to those on social issues. Portugal, Greece and Austria stand out as relatively conservative on immigration, and Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland as relatively progressive (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009). This cross-national pattern appears to conform with “perceived threat” theory: people are more opposed to immigration when they are more directly threatened by it or perceive this to be the case (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008). Consistent with this theory, the countries most opposed to immigration tend to be relatively poor, intensifying native citizens’ sense of economic competition with immigrants, and/or have seen large inflows of immigrants in recent years. In this vein, it is worth mentioning that while correlated with social/cultural attitudes in cross section, immigration attitudes do not share the social-

sues’ clear liberalizing trend over time. In fact, different cross-national studies have found a mix of increasing, decreasing, and stable trends in anti-immigration attitudes since the late 1980s (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 312–3).

2.1 Previous Approaches to Summarizing Mass Ideology

Despite the wealth of cross-national opinion data that has accumulated over the past several decades, scholars of European politics have faced substantial hurdles to summarizing general ideological trends across time and countries. The problem, notes Dalton (2010, 105), is that the “diversity of issues across elections and nations [makes it] difficult to systematically and meaningfully compare” mass ideology across political contexts. Without some degree of comparability across contexts, theories of voter behavior, partisan competition, substantive representation, and other core topics in comparative politics are all-but-impossible to evaluate empirically.¹ To surmount these difficulties with direct survey measures of mass issue attitudes, scholars of European politics have turned to proxy measures intended to summarize mass ideology in ways that are comparable across countries and over time. The two most important are citizens’ self-placement on a left–right ideological scale and the ideological location of the median voter as inferred from election results and party manifestos.

2.1.1 Self-Placement on a Left–Right Scale

Beginning with the European Community’s 1973 Eurobarometer survey, a large number of cross-national surveys in Europe have included a question asking respondents to place their political views on a ten-point left–right scale, making it the only question that has been asked regularly and consistently across countries and over time. In their seminal cross-national analysis, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976, 244) argue that the left–right scale, though also

1. Powell and Vanberg (2000, 400) note that absolute comparability across contexts is not always needed. Their analysis, for example, requires only that the “distances between points [on their left–right measure be] roughly comparable across countries.”

influenced by partisanship, can be interpreted as a “super-issue” that summarizes ideological differences over “the most *important* issues of a given era.” Following their lead, a great many scholars have used left–right self-placement scores to summarize ideological differences across countries and time (e.g., Huber 1989; Knutsen 1998) and to test substantive theories of democratic politics (Huber and Powell 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1997; Adams et al. 2004; Blais and Bodet 2006).

As many critics have noted—and many users acknowledge—left–right self-placement is an imperfect measure of mass policy ideology. Though undoubtedly related to citizens’ policy preferences, ideological self-placement is also influenced by other factors, including partisan preferences, symbolic associations, and group affiliations (Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997; Medina 2015; compare Conover and Feldman 1981; Ellis and Stimson 2012). Indeed, only a minority of European voters know what sorts of policies are associated with the labels “left” and “right” (Klingemann 1979). Self-placement scores also suffer from differential item functioning: the meaning of ideological labels varies substantially across countries and even across social groups within the same country (Thorisdottir et al. 2007; Lo, Proksch, and Gschwend 2014). “Thus, to a German blue-collar worker,” writes Dalton (2010, 105), “Left may still mean social welfare policies; to a young German college student it may mean environmental protection and issues of multiculturalism.” This last fact is particularly problematic given the multidimensionality of mass ideology in Europe, because it implies that an individual’s self-placement on the left or right can depend on which ideological dimension they interpret these labels as referring to. In sum, left–right self-placement, while by far the most useful single-question summary of ideology, is perhaps best considered a hybrid measure of political identity and personally salient issue attitudes. As such, it suffers from difficulties of comparability and interpretation that render it far from ideal as a measure of mass policy ideology.

2.1.2 Inferred Median-Voter Locations

In response to the perceived inadequacies of self-placement scores, Kim and Fording (1998) developed an alternative measure of voter ideology: the median voter's inferred position on a left–right scale (see also De Neve 2011). This measure is premised on a spatial model of elections in which the only systematic determinant of vote choice is voters' proximity to parties on a left–right ideological dimension. Under this model, the location of the median voter can be inferred from the distribution of vote share across parties with different ideological positions, which Kim and Fording (1998) measure using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) ideological ratings of party platforms (Budge et al. 2001). Assuming that this unidimensional spatial model holds and that the coding of party positions is comparable across countries and over time, median-voter scores are valid measures of mass policy preferences. Median-voter scores' calculability in years and countries where survey data are unavailable make them particularly powerful measures, and they have been used by a large number of substantive studies (e.g., Kim and Fording 2001; Stevenson 2001; McDonald and Budge 2005; Markussen 2008; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Kim, Powell, and Fording 2010; Pontusson and Rueda 2010).

Notwithstanding their usefulness, median-voter scores have been subject to a number of criticisms (for a compelling summary, see Warwick and Zakharova 2012). Some of these criticisms stem from problems with the CMP codings that underlie the median-voter scores. Since each manifesto is coded by one potentially biased human coder, parties' left–right placements are afflicted by high levels of random as well as systematic error (Curini 2010; Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012). But even granting the validity of the CMP measure of party positions, the spatial-voting assumptions required to infer the location of the median voter from party vote shares are arguably quite strong because they rule out any systematic influences on vote choice aside from ideology. More to the point, insofar as median-voter scores are used to evaluate mass–elite linkages, these assumptions risk begging the question

by presuming what they seek to demonstrate.

Finally, both median-voter and self-placement scores share the assumption that European politics takes place along a single left–right dimension. Whether or not this assumption is reasonable for elite politics (for evidence against, see Warwick 2002), it runs counter to the large literature reviewed earlier that emphasizes the multidimensionality of societal cleavages and mass policy preferences. Indeed, given that the issue-specific evidence suggests that many countries are left-wing on some issues but right-wing on others, the inadequacy of the assumption of unidimensionality is particularly glaring if the goal is cross-national comparison.

3 Inferring Ideology from Issue Preferences

The limitations of self-placement and median-voter scores are widely recognized, and even works that employ them sometimes admit that a direct survey-based measure of mass policy ideology would be preferable. Several recent reviews have called for more attention to and better measures of (multidimensional) issue preferences in the mass public (Powell 2004, 290–1; Evans 2010, 636–7; Franklin 2010, 654). At present, however, self-placement and median-voter scores are pretty much the only available options for scholars who require a time-varying, cross-national measure of mass ideology. Stevenson (2001, 623–4), for example, laments that while scholars of U.S. politics have measured mass ideology by “combining information from thousands of different survey questions,” in other democracies “the available survey data on the policy opinions of citizens . . . are not nearly as comprehensive . . . , rendering similar measurements for these countries impossible” and requiring the use of proxy measures instead. The crux of the problem, as Kim and Fording (1998, 75) put it, is the lack of “enough identical questions . . . across enough countries to provide a reasonable basis for a survey-based measure of ideology.” Though survey-based time-series of mass policy ideology

have been constructed for single countries (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011; Stimson, Thiébaud, and Tiberj 2012; McGann 2014), to date there has been no equivalent measure available for time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analyses across multiple countries.

In this section, we describe a strategy for measuring mass ideology that overcomes the problem of sparse survey data and yields dynamic, cross-national, domain-specific measures of mass policy ideology across European countries. Our approach shares attributes in common with both existing methods. Like self-placement scores, our measures are based on citizens' self-reported assessments of their own political preferences. Like the median-voter approach, however, we do not measure mass ideology directly, but rather treat it as a latent trait whose distribution can be inferred from aggregate data on citizens' political preferences. Unlike both existing approaches, we do not assume a priori that mass policy preferences are unidimensional, but rather allow them to differ across issue domains. Generating these measures requires both a measurement model for inferring latent policy ideology and a great deal of survey data with which to estimate the model. Below, we describe each of these in turn.

3.1 Measurement Model

Our approach is premised on the general framework of item response theory (IRT). In an IRT model, respondents' question responses are jointly determined by their score on some unobserved trait—in our case, their domain-specific conservatism—and by the characteristics of the particular question. In the standard two-parameter IRT model, the relationship between individual i 's unobserved trait θ_i and their response to question q is governed by the question's threshold κ_q , which captures the base level of support for the question, and its dispersion σ_q , which represents question-specific measurement error (e.g., Fox 2010, 9–11). Under the probit version of this model, respondent i 's probability of selecting the conservative

response to question q is

$$\pi_{iq} = \Phi\left(\frac{\theta_i - \kappa_q}{\sigma_q}\right), \quad (1)$$

where the normal CDF Φ maps $(\theta_i - \kappa_q)/\sigma_q$ to the unit interval.² The model assumes that greater conservatism (i.e., higher values of θ_i) increases respondents' probability of answering conservatively. The strength of this relationship is inversely proportional to σ_q , and the threshold for a conservative response is governed by κ_q . Estimating the relationship between each question and the latent trait in this way allows us to combine questions that are unevenly available over time and feature very different different baseline levels of support, and therefore differ in the extent to which they distinguish left- and right-wing survey respondents in a given domain.

In a typical setting, an individual-level IRT model would be used to estimate each respondent's conservatism based on their responses to multiple issue questions (e.g., Treier and Hillygus 2009). If a consistent set of identical questions is included in enough surveys, it can sometimes be possible to use such a model to estimate individual-level conservatism in a way that is comparable across countries and over time, as Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) have done for the United States since 1952. But because European surveys conducted in different countries and time periods have included different issue questions, and each respondent typically answers at most a handful of questions, an individual-level approach is not feasible in the European context. The way around this difficulty is to marginalize over the distribution of conservatism across individuals and instead directly estimate the average conservatism of population groups, which are often the quantities of ultimate interest anyway. We therefore instead estimate a dynamic group-level IRT model, building on the work of Mislevy (1983), McGann (2014), and especially Caughey and Warshaw (2015).

The target of inference in a DGIRT model is the average conservatism $\bar{\theta}_g$ in subpop-

2. This exposition assumes dichotomous response choices; we deal with ordinal choices below. A common alternative way of writing the model in (1) is $\pi_{iq} = \Phi(\beta_q\theta_i - \alpha_q)$, where $\beta_q = 1/\sigma_q$ and $\alpha_q = \kappa_q \times \beta_q$.

ulations indexed by g (in our case, men and women in each country). The advantage of estimating $\bar{\theta}_g$ instead of θ_i is that we can use many more questions, due to the fact that different members of the same group (possibly in different surveys) may answer different sets of questions. Under the assumption that θ_i is normally distributed within groups, the probability that a randomly sampled member of group g correctly answers item q is

$$\pi_{gq} = \Phi \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}_g - \kappa_q}{\sqrt{\sigma_q^2 + \sigma_\theta^2}} \right), \quad (2)$$

where σ_θ is the standard deviation of θ_i within groups. The probability π_{gq} can in turn be linked to the survey data through a sampling model,

$$s_{gq} \sim \text{Binomial}(n_{gq}, \pi_{gq}), \quad (3)$$

where n_{gq} is group g 's total number of non-missing responses to question q and s_{gq} is the number of those responses that are conservative.³ The estimates of $\bar{\theta}_g$ may be of interest in themselves, but they can also poststratified to produce estimates of average conservatism in each country.

Because we are interested in over-time as well as cross-sectional differences in conservatism, we estimate $\bar{\theta}_g$ separately in each biennium (e.g., 1981–82), which we index by t .⁴ To smooth the estimates across biennia, we model the evolution of $\bar{\theta}_{gt}$ as a function of its value in the preceding period ($\bar{\theta}_{g,t-1}$), time-specific shocks common to all groups (ξ_t), and

3. Following Caughey and Warshaw (2015, 202–3), we adjust the raw values of s_{gq} and n_{gq} to account for survey weights and for respondents who answer multiple questions. The latter is particularly important in this application because of the way that we deal with ordinal questions, which is to break each such question into a set of dichotomous questions, each of which indicates whether the response is above a given response level. For example, a question with three ordinal response choices, (1) “disagree”, (2) “neutral”, and (3) “agree,” would be converted into two dichotomous variables respectively indicating whether the response is above “disagree” and above “neutral.”

4. We estimate conservative by biennium because the survey data are sometimes too sparse to estimate it by year.

the demographic attributes (gender and country) of group g (\mathbf{x}_g):

$$\bar{\theta}_{gt} \sim \text{N}(\bar{\theta}_{g,t-1}\delta_t + \xi_t + \mathbf{x}'_g\gamma_t, \sigma_{\bar{\theta}_t}^2). \quad (4)$$

The weight placed on the data in biennium t relative to the prior is governed by $\sigma_{\bar{\theta}_t}$, which is estimated from the data and allowed to evolve across periods. The posterior estimates of $\bar{\theta}_{gt}$ are a compromise between this prior and the likelihood implied by Equations (2) and (3). When a lot of survey data are available for a given two-year period, the model will give the likelihood more weight relative to the prior. If no survey data are available at all, the prior acts as a predictive model that imputes $\bar{\theta}_{gt}$.

Finally, we allow for the possibility that the same question might have a different ideological meaning over time. This appears to be particularly true for certain social issues, such as gay rights, attitudes on which have liberalized more rapidly than other social issues, such as abortion. For instance, as we demonstrate in the next section of this paper (Table 2), more than half of Swedish people disapproved of homosexuality in the early 1990s, suggesting that many quite moderate Swedish respondents were opposed to it. Nowadays though, the Swedish public has liberalized so much on social issues that a Swedish person would have to be very conservative to hold such a view. Our model accommodates such changes in the mapping between question responses and latent ideology by allowing the threshold parameters κ_q to evolve between two-year periods.⁵ A potential downside of this flexible model is that it could underestimate ideological differences over time by attributing a portion of the true difference to changes in the question thresholds. But as the Swedish example suggests, the assumption that the ideological meaning of questions is constant over the thirty-three years of our data is very unrealistic. Allowing questions with idiosyncratic trends to change independently of other issues in the same domain thus strengthens the

5. Technically, we model the temporal evolution of $\alpha_{qt} = \kappa_{qt}/\sigma_q$ with a random-walk prior centered on $\alpha_{q,t-1}$.

over-time comparability of our estimates of general conservatism in a given domain.

3.2 Data and Dimensionality

We estimated the model just described using a dataset of over a million distinct respondents' answers to dozens of survey questions on a variety of domestic policy issues. The dataset begins in 1981, with the first cross-national European surveys that contained substantial numbers of issue questions, and continues through 2014. All existing cross-national surveys in Europe are represented in this dataset, including the European Social Survey (ESS), various modules of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Values Survey (EVS), some special editions of the Eurobarometer, and the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Though we hope in future work to expand our cross-national coverage, for now we restrict our attention to Western and Southern Europe, excluding the countries of the former Eastern Bloc due to their distinct economic and political legacy of communism. Not all countries are represented in every survey, and some (notably Greece and Cyprus) do not enter the data until the end of the 1980s.

We also restricted the survey questions used in the data. Our first criterion was that questions had to be asked in the same form in more than one year and more than one country. Second, because our goal is a measure of conservatism that is comparable in an absolute sense across countries and time, we included only questions that asked about desired policy outcomes in the abstract or about general ideological principles. We therefore exclude the many survey questions that ask respondents about their preferences regarding the policy status quo, such as their support for more or less spending in a given policy area (Soroka and Wlezien 2005). This is an important point of contrast with measures of “public policy mood,” which is intended to measure the public’s general desire for more or less government activity *relative* to what is currently being provided (Stimson 1991). Since policies differ across countries, two equally conservative respondents might give different answers to the

same relative question, and so a measure of conservatism that included such questions could not be compared in absolute terms across countries. Of course, just because questions are not explicitly relative does not mean that the policy status quo does not influence respondents' answers, but it does give greater face validity to this claim. After this pruning, we were left with 118 distinct questions across a variety of policy areas, each of which are repeated rarely and inconsistently over time. The temporal coverage of questions and countries are shown in the Appendix, in Figures A1 and A2, which highlight the sparsity issues that our approach overcomes.

As noted above, one of the major advantages of inferring ideology from many issue questions is that we can allow conservatism to vary across policy domains, thus respecting the multidimensionality of European politics. Given the debate over whether issues of immigration and nationalism constitute a distinct ideological dimension of their own (Heath et al. 1999; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014), we classify questions into three domains, thus allowing for a potentially three-dimensional political space. The first domain, which we label "economic," captures the classic left–right divide over the size and scope of government and its role in mitigating inequality. The second domain, which we label "social," includes postmaterial and cultural issues such as gender equality, abortion, gay rights, environmental protection, and libertarianism versus authoritarian. We label the third domain "immigration," but it also includes issues related to nationalism and national identity. The final dataset includes 51 survey questions on economic issues, 42 questions on social and postmaterial issues, and 25 questions on immigration. (Full details of all questions are available in the Supplementary Information, including sources, question wording and response scales.) We estimate domain-specific conservatism by applying the DGIRT model separately to each question subset.

To illustrate our raw survey data, Tables 1–3 display example questions from our datasets

Table 1: Economic Issues

Survey	Question	Year	Percent choosing conservative responses				
			Portugal	Italy	Germany	Great Britain	Sweden
ISSP* Role of Government & Inequality Modules	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high income and those with low income	1985		13.8		23.5	
		1990		14.3	18.4	24.8	
		1992		9.4	15.2	19.9	29.3
		1999	6.3		22.0	15.1	18.4
		2009	3.5	6.5	20.4	17.7	18.5
ISSP Role of Government Modules	It is the responsibility of the government to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	1985		4.3		3.9	
		1990		5.0	3.7	4.5	
		1996		9.1	3.1	7.0	2.2
		2006	1.3		6.9	11.8	3.6
ISSP Inequality Modules	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes	1987		20.9		22.9	
		1992		13.7	10.3		23.2
		1999	11.7		19.7	21.3	23.7
		2009	16.2	6.3	15.8	23.2	27.7
ISSP Role of Government Modules	Should be government's responsibility to provide decent housing to those who can't afford it	1990		9.5	16.5	7.0	
		1996		11.7	17.8	11.0	17.8
		2006	5.2		22.4	14.3	20.6

**ISSP = International Social Survey Program*

that have some of the strongest influence on our eventual scales.⁶ Each table displays the percent of people offering conservative responses to a given question, meaning that respon-

6. In terms of the model outlined earlier, these are questions which have some of the lowest estimated dispersion parameters, or equivalently, the highest ideological discrimination.

Table 2: Social and Postmaterial Issues

Survey	Question	Year	Percent choosing conservative responses				
			Portugal	Italy	Germany	Great Britain	Sweden
European Values Survey	Abortion can never be justified	1981		54.2	58.6	54.2	
		1990	52.5	50.3	48.7	43.1	35.1
		1999	57.5	52.0	48.5	43.7	14.6
		2008-9	43.6		47.5	38.8	12.7
European Values Survey	Homosexuality can never be justified	1981		78.2	65.7	64.1	52.6
		1990	81.0	60.7	53.6	61.4	52.6
		1999	67.3	43.8	34.6	42.6	16.7
		2008-9	48.9		35.6	35.8	17.5
ISSP* Environment Modules	We worry too much about future environmental problems and not enough about prices and jobs	1993		46.6	36.9	37.5	
		2000	59.2		35.8	36.2	19.1
		2010			31.0	44.6	22.1
ISSP Family & Gender Modules	Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	1988		65.2		42.2	
		1994		64.7	51.5	33.5	31.1
		2002	66.0		41.7	35.7	25.6
		2012			31.9	27.3	16.8

*ISSP = International Social Survey Program; German data prior to 1990 are for East and West Germany combined

dents were against redistribution or government intervention in the economy, held traditional views on social issues, or opposed immigration. Results are shown for five countries that represent different regions of Europe, with Italy and Portugal representing Southern Europe, where countries have been surveyed less frequently.

Table 3: Immigration and Nationalism

Survey	Question	Year	Percent choosing conservative responses				
			Portugal	Italy	Germany	Great Britain	Sweden
European Values Survey	When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [nationality] people over immigrants	1990	87.6	73.5	64.0	50.8	34.6
		1999	63.4	61.4	58.6	58.1	11.3
		2008-9	69.7		48.6	67.5	22.8
ISSP*	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in this country	1995		38.1	35.0	48.7	16.7
National Identity Modules		2003	55.8		45.4	44.8	7.8
		2013			22.2	50.6	13.3
European Social Survey	Government should not allow any immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here	2002	21.9	9.2	7.2	14.9	2.4
		2006	29.9		16.6	17.3	3.2
		2012	36.4	11.8	5.6		1.5

**ISSP = International Social Survey Program*

For almost every year and every question, there is a north–south divide across countries. This of course is consistent with the literature on mass ideology in Europe reviewed above. On economic issues, Italy and Portugal are somewhat more left-wing than the other three countries, with Great Britain, Germany and Sweden often more conservative. Italy and Portugal held more traditional social views in each period, with Britain and Germany in the middle, and Sweden much more progressive. Over time, all countries liberalized on social issues; Sweden showed the most dramatic changes, while change was slower elsewhere, leaving countries more polarized than in the past. For immigration, the picture is a little more complex. Generally, Sweden stands out as far more progressive than anywhere else,

with Great Britain and Portugal more opposed than Italy or Germany, and with some evidence of rising opposition to immigration over time. In this paper, we move beyond such descriptions of raw survey data, but these patterns are clearly reflected in our estimated ideological scales.

4 Estimates of Mass Policy Conservatism

Using the data and model described above, we constructed biennial estimates of average conservatism among men and women in each Western European country in our three issue domains. In addition to being substantively interesting, estimating conservatism separately by gender improves the performance of the the model insofar as men and women’s policy views differ systematically. Our country-level estimates of mean conservatism are simply the average of each country’s estimates for men and women in a given two-year period. We estimated the models using the Bayesian simulation program `Stan` as called from the R package `dgo` (Stan Development Team 2015; Dunham, Caughey, and Warshaw 2016), basing our inferences on 3,336 samples from the posterior distribution.⁷ All survey questions were first re-coded so that higher response values indicate more conservative opinions (opposition to government intervention, opposition to immigration, and so on), meaning that higher scores on our scales represent greater conservatism.

We begin by examining general trends in mass conservatism within each issue domain, distinguishing between men and women. In line with the existing literature (e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), we find that on economic issues, European men have consistently displayed greater conservatism than their female counterparts (Figure 1, top panel).⁸ By

7. Models were estimated in parallel across 4 chains, discarding the first 7,500 iterations in each chain and thinning the remaining 2,500 iterations at an interval of 3. All hyperparameters were assigned vague but proper priors.

8. Figure 1 presents averages across countries, without weighting for country population size. The posterior probability that men are more conservative than women is greater than 95% in every biennium except 1983–84. Note that because estimates of men and women are strongly correlated within year, the




Figure 1: Trends in Mass Conservatism by Gender and Issue Domain

contrast, on social and immigration issues (middle and bottom panels), men and women hold much more similar opinions. On social issues, there is some evidence that the gender gap has reversed sign. Through the 1990s, women were at least as socially conservative as men, if not more so, but since 2007 women have emerged as slightly more progressive on average.⁹ On immigration issues, there are no clear gender differences at all.

The three issue domains differ as well in their trends over time. Net of question-specific temporal variation, there is only slight evidence that Europeans have become less economically conservative over time. What change has occurred is concentrated in the last few years, particularly in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008–09. Social conservatism, on the other hand, declined substantially and fairly steadily over this period. It is now almost 0.4 units lower than it was in the early 1980s—a difference about as large as the contemporary ideological gap between Greece and Belgium. Due to lack of survey data we can estimate immigration conservatism only since 1989; we find that it too decreased through the 1990s, but unlike social conservatism it has changed little since then, rising only slightly.

So far, we have seen that the ideological gender gap differs across issue domain, and that mass opinion across the three domains has exhibited distinct ideological trajectories. We now turn to a consideration of variation across countries, patterns of which are summarized in Figure 2. Within each panel of this figure, countries are ordered according to their average conservatism across years in the corresponding issue domain. One pattern that emerges from this figure is a clear north–south divide on all three domains. The ideological polarity of this divide, however, differs across domain. Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal cluster near the progressive end of the economic scale (top panel) anchoring the conservative end of the social and immigration scales (middle and bottom panels). By the same token, Sweden, the Netherlands, and other Northern European countries are the least

confidence intervals exaggerate the overlap between the posterior distributions of men and women.

9. The probability that since 2007 men have been more conservative than women is 99%.




Figure 2: Conservatism in 1989–90 and 2013–14, by country and issue domain. Vertical lines indicate the cross-country average in each biennium (solid = 1989–90, dashed = 2013–14).

conservative on social and immigration issues but the most conservative on economics. The fact that some of the most advanced welfare states in Europe have economically conservative publics may seem paradoxical, but it faithfully reflects the underlying survey data, as we saw in Table 1, as well as the existing literature on European public opinion discussed earlier. It bears re-emphasizing that we consciously excluded survey questions that ask about changes relative to the status quo, though this does not preclude the possibility that respondents nevertheless interpreted questions in relative terms.

Consistent with the time series plotted in Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that between 1989–90 and 2013–14 mass opinion moved leftward in all three domains, though by far the largest shift occurred on social issues. Aside from a few imprecisely estimated countries, every Western European public had become much less socially conservative by the end of the period. The order of countries is quite similar across years, but there were a few reversals. Spain, for example, was more socially conservative than France in 1989–90 but by 2013–14 had become less conservative. On economic and immigration issues leftward shifts are less universal, and a few countries—Great Britain and the Netherlands on immigration and Denmark on economics—actually became more conservative. Denmark is particularly interesting in light of the opposite trajectory of its neighbor Sweden, which in 1989–90 was more economically conservative than Denmark but by 2013–14 had become markedly less so.¹⁰

As geographic polarization in all three issue domains has grown, countries’ ideological placements have become increasingly correlated across domains (see Figure 3). This is especially true of the correlation between social conservatism and conservatism in other domains. Social and immigration conservatism have always tended to go together, but their correlation has increased from below 0.5 in the 1990s to above 0.8 after 2005. This seems to suggest that although their trends have differed over time, cross-sectionally immigration has actually been folded into the social dimension rather than emerging as its own dimension.

10. The first comparison has a posterior probability of 99% and the second, 100%.




Figure 3: Correlations Across Issue Domains in Different Eras

Over this same period, the negative correlation between social and economic conservatism has also approximately doubled in magnitude, to about -0.6 . Only the correlation between immigration and economic conservatism has remained roughly constant, hovering around -0.6 as well.¹¹ These negative correlations imply that it is not meaningful to say that certain European publics are conservative across the board. Rather, in contemporary Western and Southern Europe, countries that are conservative on economic issues are nearly all relatively progressive on social and economic issues, and countries that are economically left-wing tend to be right-wing on other issues.

5 Comparison to Proxies for Mass Policy Preferences

We now turn to a comparison between our estimates of domain-specific conservatism and the two most commonly used measures of mass ideology: left–right self-placement and median-voter positions. As noted above, neither of the two existing measures is derived from citizens’ expressed issue preferences. Rather, self-placement scores capture citizens’ identification with different ideological labels, and median-voter positions are inferred from election results under assumptions of spatial voting. Moreover, both existing measures presume that mass policy preferences in Europe vary along a single left–right dimension. For these reasons, especially the last, we should expect self-placement and median-voter scores to have little relationship with at least one and possibly all three of our measures of domain-specific conservatism.

This is in fact what we find. Figure 4 summarizes the bivariate relationships between left–right self-placement scores, median-voter scores, and economic, social, and immigration conservatism.¹² The panels below the diagonal plot the relationship across country-biennia

11. The basic patterns persist if we account for measurement error by comparing the posterior distributions of correlation coefficients, indicating that the increasing correlations are not an artifact of the reduction in measurement error over time.

12. Data for left–right self-placement come from all Eurobarometer surveys containing the question over

between pairs of variables; the panels above indicate the corresponding pairwise correlation coefficients.¹³ The first thing to note is that despite the fact that they purport to measure the same concept, left–right self-placement and median-voter scores are essentially uncorrelated across country-biennia. Both Danes and Norwegians, for example, tend to place themselves at the right end of the ideological scale, but according to median-voter scores the median Danish voter is relatively conservative whereas the median Norwegian is extremely left-wing. Similarly, the median voter in both France and Greece is estimated to be moderate, but Greeks describe themselves as very right-wing whereas the French do the opposite.

The proxy measures’ relationships with our survey-based measures of conservatism provide some suggestions about the source of these discrepancies. Both measures display a modest positive correlation with economic conservatism, and self-placement (but not median-voter) scores also do so with social conservatism. Neither is positively correlated with immigration conservatism. Multivariate regression reveals essentially the same patterns: both social and (less certainly) economic conservatism predict ideological self-placement, but only economic conservatism predicts the location of the median-voter.¹⁴ The predictive power of the survey-based measures, however, is not great: collectively, they explain 16% of the variation in self-placement scores and 9% of the variation in median voter scores.¹⁵ Moreover, it appears likely that citizens in different countries are thinking of different ideological dimensions when describing their ideological positions. It seems, for example, that Scandinavians publics must be thinking of economic issues given that most place themselves on the

the period. Our country-level measure for each period is the weighted average of all individual responses in that period, as in past studies. The median voter positions come from an update to the original Kim-Fording dataset produced by De Neve (2011).

13. The patterns in this figure are very similar to those that emerge if we average the variables within country across time and examine their cross-sectional relationships.

14. These inferences are from a least-squares regression with economic, social, and immigration conservatism as regressors and the country-biennium as the unit of the analysis, with standard errors clustered by country.

15. The analogous R^2 statistics for a cross-sectional regression, with country as the unit of analysis, are 12% for self-placement and 19% for median-voter scores.




Figure 4: Correlations between self-placement scores, median-voter locations, and our measures of domain-specific conservatism. Each observation is a country-biennium dyad. The year range is 1989–2014 for the left-right scale, 1989–2004 for median vote scores, and 1989–2014 for the conservatism estimates.

right, which clearly contradicts their highly progressive attitudes on social and immigration issues. On the other hand, Greeks and Cypriots *also* consistently rate themselves as relatively right-wing, which is in line with their stance on social issues and immigration but not on economics. The Portuguese and Dutch both rate themselves as centrist, despite being at the extreme (and opposite) ends of all our scales.

The temporal patterns in the measures contrast with each other as well. As others have observed (e.g., Knutsen 1998), over the past decades there has been little aggregate movement towards the left or right in citizens' ideological self-placement. Median-voter scores, by contrast, are in many countries much more variable over time. As Warwick and Zakharova (2012, 174) note, this can lead to implausible results, as when Denmark, between the 1998 and 2001 elections, moved about a standard deviation to the right on the median-voter scale while displaying essentially no change in ideological self-placement.¹⁶ Similarly, Portugal is estimated to have gone from having one of the most right-wing electorates in Europe to one of the most left-wing in just twelve years (1987 to 1999), while Sweden is estimated to have done the opposite in only six years (1988 to 1994). Neither countries' issue opinions changed over those periods in anything like such a dramatic fashion. A likely explanation is that these large changes are caused by changes in vote shares that may not reflect voters moving closer to certain parties ideologically, but rather the effect of economic conditions or other valence considerations.

In summary, self-placement and median-voter scores, in addition to being essentially uncorrelated with each other, are at best weakly related to survey-derived summaries of the public's domain-specific conservatism. This suggests that the two existing measures are not especially good proxies for mass policy preferences and in fact measure distinct concepts. Thus far, however, we have not fully established the validity of our own measures. We turn

16. The Danish public's economic conservatism, however, did increase substantially between these election, though its social conservatism decreased by almost as much.

to this task in the following section.

6 Validation

We provide evidence for the validity of our measures of mass policy conservatism with two kinds of validation: convergent and construct (Adcock and Collier 2001). The purpose of convergent validation is to show that a new measure is empirically associated with alternative measures of the same concept. We do this by comparing our conservatism estimates with responses to individual survey questions in the corresponding domain and with single-nation dynamic measures of mass conservatism. We then turn to construct validation, the goal of which is demonstrate the empirical association between a new measure of a given concept and existing measures of different concepts widely believed to be causally related to the concept of interest. We do this by evaluating the cross-sectional and dynamic relationships between mass conservatism and government policies in the same domain. Overall, we find abundant evidence that our measures are valid summaries of mass policy preferences in a given domain.

6.1 Convergent Validation: Comparison with Survey-Based Measures

We begin with convergent validation, demonstrating that our measures are strongly correlated with alternative indicators of domain-specific policy preferences. Specifically, we compare our IRT-based conservatism estimates with responses to highly ideological survey questions in each domain. Figure 5 shows the correlation of our estimates on all three domains with one “internal” issue question that is included in the data used to estimate the corresponding conservatism scores (left column) and one “external” issue question that does not contribute to our estimates (right column). The upper-left panel of Figure 5 shows that




Figure 5: Correlations between domain-specific conservatism and individual issue questions. The left column validates the scale against “internal” issue questions included in the data used to estimate the corresponding conservatism scores, whereas the right column validates against “external” questions not included in the original data.

our estimates of economic preferences in 2003–04 have a correlation of 0.91 with an estimate of support for income redistribution in the 2002–06 ESS that we include in our dataset. The upper-right panel shows that our estimates of economic preferences (in 2013–14) also have a strong correlation (0.72) with a survey question from the 2013 TransAtlantic Trends Survey that we do not include in our dataset.¹⁷ The middle panel validates our estimates on the social domain, showing that our estimates have correlations of 0.86 with a survey question about support for gay rights from the 2012 ESS that we include in our dataset (middle-left panel), as well as a question about gay rights on the 2015 ESS (middle-right panel) that we not include in our dataset.¹⁸ Finally, the lower panel validates our estimates on the immigration domain. It indicates that our estimates have correlations of 0.85 with a survey question on immigration preferences from the 2012 ESS (lower-left), as well as a survey question about whether immigrants are a burden in Pew’s 2015 Global Attitudes survey (lower-right).¹⁹

Next, we evaluate the dynamics in our estimates by comparing them with previous single-country measures of public preferences produced for the UK (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011) and France (Stimson, Thiébaud, and Tiberj 2012).²⁰ Figure 6 compares the different measures (all have been standardized for ease of comparison).²¹ It shows that our measures generally pick up the same trends as previous single-country scales. For France, both our estimates and those of Stimson et al. suggest that France gradually became more

17. We did not include the 2013 TransAtlantic Trends Survey in our model due to its limited coverage of European countries.

18. We did not include the 2015 ESS in our model because our dataset only extends to 2014.

19. We did not include Pew’s 2015 Global Attitudes survey because our dataset only extends to 2014.

20. Both studies aim to produce summaries of the public’s left–right ideology or preferences, although both sets of authors include questions referencing the policy status quo, making their measures sit somewhere in between measures of pure ideology and “public policy mood.” Importantly though, they share many of the same sorts of questions as in our data yet are constructed from entirely different, nationally-specific surveys, so it is very useful to compare our findings to theirs.

21. The UK estimates of Bartle, Stimson and Avellaneda place all survey questions onto a single left–right scale, and so we compare our economic and social dimensions to this single measure, whereas Stimson, Thiébaud and Tiberj estimate two dimensions, one for economic issues and a second covering all other issues. We therefore compare our economic scale to their economic scale, and our social/postmaterial scales to their second-dimension measure. Bartle et al.’s measure ends in 2005, and Stimson et al.’s end in 2008.




Figure 6: Comparing our domain-specific IRT estimates with previous country-specific measures. The comparison measures for France (left column) are taken from Stimson, Thiébaud, and Tiberj (2012), who estimate policy mood separately for economic (top) and social issues (bottom). The comparison measure for Great Britain (right) is from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson (2011), who pool economic and social issues together to estimate a single measure of mood (top and bottom). All series have been standardized to have zero-mean and unit-variance within country, and are coded so that higher scores are conservative.

left-wing on both dimensions up to the mid-2000s, with the economic measures diverging only in the early 1980s when our measures are most uncertain. For the UK, both Bartle et al.’s approach and ours show that the UK became more economically left-wing up to the late 1990s, and more conservative into the early 2000s. The correlation for social issues is slightly lower, probably because Bartle et al. only estimate a single dimension, and the measures diverge later in the period, when the UK became more socially liberal. Overall, these comparisons lend credence to our measurement strategy.

6.2 Construct Validation: Policy Representation

We now evaluate the empirical relationships between our conservatism estimates and policy outcomes in the same domain. Assuming that government policies are indeed influenced by mass policy preferences (for a review, see Powell 2004, 282–91), empirical evidence for this theoretical relationship should constitute construct validation of our measures. Considering one policy area in each issue domain, we find that domain-specific conservatism not only predicts government policies but does so better than existing alternatives. We first report cross-sectional analyses of the social and immigration domains and then describe a panel analysis of economic policy.

6.2.1 Social Conservatism and Gay Rights Policy

First, we examine policy responsiveness on gay rights issues using the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association’s “Rainbow Map” of the liberalism of European countries’ gay rights policies. This index is based on over 50 distinct gay rights policies on topics such as same-sex marriage, hate crime, non-discrimination laws, and family rights. As the left panel of Figure 7 shows, across countries there is a strong negative association between mass conservatism and the expansiveness of gay rights policies ($r = -0.64$). In other words, countries where the public has more progressive social views




Figure 7: Cross-sectional responsiveness of gay rights policies to mass social conservatism (left panel) and average self-placement on the left-right scale (right panel).

have more progressive social policies. As the right panel shows, this is also true of countries where citizens are more likely to place themselves on the “left,” but the correlation is about half as strong ($r = -0.32$) and not statistically significant. This suggests that government gay rights policies are more responsive to domain-specific mass conservatism than to general ideological identification.²²

6.2.2 Immigration Conservatism and Migrant Integration

We next conduct an analogous analysis of immigration policy. To capture ideological variation in countries’ immigration policy we use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which measures policies to integrate migrants in all EU Member States as well as many other countries around the world. The MIPEX is based on 167 policies related to labor market mobility for migrants, anti-discrimination laws, and many other areas related to migration. As Figure 8 shows, the correlation between government policy and mass conservatism is

22. We do not compare policy to median-voter scores because our data end in 2004, and even in years before then are often missing in many countries.




Figure 8: Cross-sectional responsiveness of migrant integration policies to mass immigration conservatism (left panel) and average self-placement on the left–right scale (right panel).

again about twice as strong as its correlation with left–right self-placement ($r = -0.57$ vs. $r = -0.31$). Thus, like gay rights, policies designed to integrate migrants into society appear to respond to citizens’ immigration-specific conservatism in the receiving country.

6.2.3 Economic Conservatism and Wage Replacement Rates

Our final piece of construct validation analyzes the relationship between the generosity of countries’ welfare policies and the economic conservatism of their publics. As has already been noted, mass economic conservatism actually tends to have a *positive* cross-sectional correlation with welfare generosity. Much more so than social and immigration issues, however, the cross-sectional relationship between economic opinion and policy is likely to be confounded by discrepancies in national wealth and other preexisting differences between countries. One advantage of the economic domain relative to the others, however, is the greater availability of data on countries’ policies over time, which enables us to exploit within-country variation in mass conservatism and economic policies. We do so by regress-



Figure 9: Point estimates and confidence intervals from a two-way fixed regressions of welfare replacement rate on median-voter location, left-right self-placement scores, and mass economic conservatism, all coded so that higher values are more conservative. The unit of analysis is the country-biennium. The effects have been standardized by rescaling all variables to have unit-variance across the observations used in the estimation. Confidence intervals are calculated using the wild bootstrap, clustered by country.

ing policy on opinion while controlling for country- and biennium-specific intercepts, which allows us to rule out persistent country-specific factors (as well as continent-wide trends) as confounders to the opinion-policy relationship.²³

The specific policy indicator we analyze is countries’ gross replacement rates—the percent of wages replaced by unemployment benefits when a worker loses their job—in each biennium.²⁴ A score of 100% on this metric implies an extremely generous welfare system that replaces all lost income, and a score of 0% a very stingy one (empirically the rate ranges from 3% to 65%). The replacement rate is an especially useful measure of governments’ policy stance on welfare because unlike other measures of social spending, it is not affected by the economic cycle, making it easier to isolate the impact of mass ideology.

Figure 9 summarizes the results of two sets of analysis, both using data starting in 1989. The first analysis is a two-way fixed-effects regression of the welfare replacement rate on median-voter location, self-placement scores, and mass economic conservatism. This

23. We account for within-country dependence by using the wild cluster bootstrap (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008; Esarey 2016) to calculate confidence intervals.

24. These data were obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Data on replacement rates are not available for Cyprus or Northern Ireland, so we exclude both countries from our analysis. In addition, data on Italy are available only through 2005–06.

Multivariate analysis enables us to evaluate the effects of these three alternative measures conditional on the others. The downside of doing this is that because median-voter scores in particular are often missing, it forces us to drop over 70% of country-biennia. To avoid this, we also estimated two-way fixed-effects regressions separately for each alternative ideology measure, which results in differing sample sizes and coverage across measures.

Regardless of whether we use a multivariate or bivariate specification, the basic pattern is the same. Within country, mass economic conservatism exhibits negative covariation with the wage replacement rate, as should be expected. The location of the median-voter, on the other hand, has no within-country relationship with the replacement rate. And, counter-intuitively, citizens' propensity to place themselves on the right side of the ideological scale is actually positively associated with welfare generosity. In short, the only variable whose covariance with economic policies is consistent with responsiveness to citizens' preferences is our measure of mass economic conservatism. This again reinforces the validity of our measurement strategy and highlights the usefulness of our estimates for investigating important substantive questions.

7 Conclusion

This paper has described the first dynamic, cross-national summaries of mass conservatism derived from the expressed issue preferences of European survey respondents. The measures cover 18 countries, 34 years, and three policy domains: economic, social, and immigration. We have validated our measures against individual issue questions, time series of country-specific policy mood, and countries' policies themselves, finding robust evidence of their validity as summaries of domain-specific conservatism.

Our new measures highlight several salient patterns. They reveal, for example, that European publics have moved markedly to the left on social issues, but much less so on eco-

nomics and immigration. Throughout the period, men have consistently displayed greater economic conservatism than women, whereas in the other two domains there is little evidence of a gender gap. Cross-nationally, our measures exhibit strong north–south cleavages, with Southern Europe relatively right-wing on social and immigration issues but left-wing on economics. This reversed polarity indicates that cross-national variation in European mass ideology cannot be captured with a single left–right dimension, at least as those labels are commonly understood. Thus, while our estimates are consistent with much issue-specific research, they call into question the validity of existing unidimensional measures as summaries of mass policy preferences.

This is not to say, however, that our measures have rendered left–right self-placement and median-voter scores obsolete. Rather, our findings suggest that they are measuring concepts distinct from mass policy conservatism (and, given their weak correlation, from each other). Self-placement scores may very well be valid summaries of citizens’ positions on the dominant “super-issue” of the day, but these positions are heavily inflected with partisan and symbolic considerations, and insofar as they reflect policy preferences these are weighted differentially according to personal and contextual factors. For their part, median-voter locations are probably best viewed as summaries of electorates’ revealed preferences over parties, which are a function as much of valence factors like the state of the economy as the parties’ platforms. Both of these measures may still be profitably used in substantive analyses, and both have advantages over our conservatism measures, such as longer temporal coverage. But applied scholars should think carefully about whether the concepts captured by these measures are really the ones of theoretical and normative interest. If they are in fact interested in summaries of mass policy preferences, then our measures are a more appropriate choice.

Given the central place that citizens’ policy preferences play in normative and positive theories of politics, the scope of potential applications of our measures is vast. In addition to

facilitating descriptive inferences about ideological patterns in the mass public, they also can be used to examine governments' responsiveness to citizens' preferences, as we have shown. These analyses could of course be extended to examine the institutional and contextual moderators of policy representation. Additional topics include the role that mass policy preferences in electoral outcomes and these preferences' responsiveness to shifting economic and social conditions. We hope and expect that other researchers use our estimates to explore these and other important questions. To facilitate this, we have made our estimates available to the public and will continue to update them as more survey data is released.

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
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
Supplementary Information for “Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981-2014”

Figure S1: Coverage of Questions in the three datasets



Note: Each square represents the appearance of a given question in a given year in the relevant dataset. See the Appendix for full details of each question.

Figure S2: Coverage of Countries in the three datasets



Note: Each dot represents the appearance of a given country in a given year in the relevant dataset

Survey Items Included in the Models

Key to datasets: ISSP = International Survey Program; ROG = “Role of Government” survey modules; INEQ = “Social Inequality” survey modules; ENV = “Environment” survey modules; NI = “National Identity” survey modules; F+G = “Family and Gender” survey modules; ESS = European Social Survey; EVS = European Values Survey; EB VAL = Eurobarometer special surveys on social values; EB EMP = Eurobarometer special surveys on employment and social policy; EB POV = Eurobarometer special surveys on poverty and social exclusion; PEW = Pew Global Attitudes Survey

Table 1: **Variables included in the Economic Model**

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
govredist1	ISSP ROG, ISSP INEQ., ISSP ENV	1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2009, 2010	What is your opinion of the following statement: “it is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between those with high incomes and those with low incomes”	5-point 1 = agree strongly, 5 = disagree strongly
wagecont	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996	“Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against” ... control of wages by law	5-point 1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against
pricecont	ISSP RÖG	1990, 1996	[as above] ... control of prices by law	5-point
govjobs	ISSP RÖG	1990, 1996,	[as above] ... financing of projects to create new jobs	1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against 5-point
govindust	ISSP ROG	2006 1990, 1996,	[as above] ... support for industry to develop new products and technology	1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against 5-point
govdecline	ISSP ROG	2006 1990, 1996,	[as above] ... support for declining industries to protect jobs	1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against 5-point
govweek	ISSP RÖG	2006 1990, 1996,	[as above] ... reducing the working week to create more jobs	1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against 5-point
unempinfl	ISSP RÖG	2006 1990, 1996	If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment, to which do you think it should give the highest priority?	1 = strongly favor, 5 = strongly against 2-point 1 = unemployment, 2 = inflation
unionpower	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996	Do you think that trade unions in this country have too much power or too little power?	5-point 1 = far too little, 5 = far too much

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Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
buspower	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996,	What about business and industry? Do they have too much power or too little power?	5-point 1 = far too much, 5 = far too little
govpower	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996	What about the government? Does it have too much power or too little power?	5-point 1 = far too little, 5 = far too much
ownelect	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996	What do you think should be the government's role in each of these industries and services should be? ... Electricity [as above] ... Banking and Insurance	1 = Own it 2 = control prices and profits, don't own 3 = neither As above
ownbanks	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the responsibility of the government to ... provide a job for everyone who wants one	4-point 1 = definitely should be 4 = definitely should not be
respjob	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... provide healthcare for the sick	As above
resphealth	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... provide a decent standard of living for the old	As above
respond	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... provide industry with the help it needs to grow	As above
respump	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	As above
govredist2	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... reduce income differences between the rich and poor	As above
respstud	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... give financial help to university students from low-income families	As above
resphouse	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	[as above] ... provide decent housing for those who can't afford it	As above
govredist	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements ... "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels"	5-point 1 = agree strongly, 5 = disagree strongly
equalopp	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	"It is important that every person in the world should be treated equally, and everyone should have equal opportunities in life."	6-point top 3 responses indicate disagreement

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Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
eqincent	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	“How would you place your views on this scale?” 1 = incomes should be made more equal ...	10-point
provide	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	10 = we need larger income differences as incentives [as above] 1 = the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for ... 10 = people should take more responsibility for providing for themselves	10-point
unempjob	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	[as above] 1 = people who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want ... 10 = people who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits	10-point
secfair	EVS	1990, 1999-00	“Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practically the same job. In your opinion is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than, the other if she is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job?”	2-point 1 = unfair, 2 = fair
confsoc	EVS	1990, 1999-00	“Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them” ... the social security system’	4-point 1 = a great deal, 4 = none at all
confunions	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	[as above] ... trade unions	4-point 1 = a great deal, 4 = none at all
concomp	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of the unemployed—?	5-point 1 = very much, 5 = not at all
diffnec	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992, 2009	In order to get people to work hard, do you think large differences in pay are necessary?	4-point 1 = definitely not, 4 = absolutely
incprosp	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992, 2009	Do you agree or disagree with these statements ... “large differences in income are necessary for a country’s prosperity”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
busprosp	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992	[as above] ... “allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone’s standard of living	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
unipoor	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992	Please show how much you agree or	5-point

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Table 1 – *Continued from previous page*

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
respjob1	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992	disagree with these statements ... “the government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to university” [as above] ... “the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one”	1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree 5-point
respu1	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992	[as above] ... “the government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed”	1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree 5-point
basicinc	ISSP INEQ	2009 1987, 1992	[as above] ... “the government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income”	1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree 5-point
taxrich1	ISSP INEQ	1987, 1992, 1999, 2009	Do you think that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share or a smaller share?	1 = much larger share 5 = much smaller share
privent	ISSP ENV	1993, 2000, 2010	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements ... “private enterprise is the best way to solve my country’s problems”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
freecom	EB VAL	2006, 2008, 2009	For each of the following propositions, tell me if you agree or disagree ... “Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity “	4-point 1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree
eqjust	EB VAL	2006, 2008, 2009	[as above] ... “We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual”	4-point 1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree
govredist3	EB POV	2009, 2010	For each of the following propositions, tell me if you agree or disagree ... “the government should ensure that the wealth of the country is redistributed in a fair way to all citizens”	4-point 1 = totally agree, 4 = totally disagree
taxhigher	EB POV	2009, 2010	[as above]” People who are well-off should pay higher taxes so the government has more means to fight poverty”	4-point 1 = totally agree, 4 = totally disagree
nofight	EB POV	2002, 2010	[as above] “There is no point in trying to fight poverty, it will always exist”	4-point 1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree
diffinec1	EB POV	2009, 2010	[as above] “Income inequalities are necessary for economic development ”	4-point 1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree

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Table 1 – Continued from previous page

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
freemkt	PEW	2002, 07, 08, 09	Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor	4-point 1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree
interfere	PEW	2002, 09, 11, 12	whats more important in (survey country) society that everyone be free to pursue their lifes goals lifes goals without interference from the state, or that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need?	4-point 1 = option 2, 2 =option 1

Table 2: Variables included in the Social and Postmaterial Issues Model

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
meetings	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	There are many ways people or organisations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed: “Organizing public meetings to protest against the government” [as above] “Organising protest marches and demonstrations” [as above] “Organising a nationwide strike of all workers against the government”	4-point 1 = definitely, 4 = definitely not
protests	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	“Organizing public meetings to protest against the government” [as above] “Organising protest marches and demonstrations”	4-point 1 = definitely, 4 = definitely not
strikes	ISSP ROG	1990, 1996, 2006	“Organising a nationwide strike of all workers against the government”	4-point 1 = definitely, 4 = definitely not
respenvir	ISSP ROG	1996, 2006 2006	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the responsibility of the government to... “impose strict laws to make industry do less damage	4-point 1 = definitely should be 4 = definitely should not be

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Table 2 – Continued from previous page

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
kidjob	ISSP F+G, 1988, 1990, 1994, ISSP ENV 1999, 2002, 2008, 2012	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	to the environment” To what extent do you agree or disagree...? “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
workmoth	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work”	5-point 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree
famjob	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
housewife	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
husbwife	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
singparent	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “One parent can bring up a child as well as two parents together”	5-point 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree
workkid	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all under the following circumstances? “When there is a child under school age”	3-point 1 = work full-time, 3 = stay at home
workschool	ISSP F+G	1988, 1994, 2002, 2012	[as above] “After the youngest child starts school”	3-point 1 = work full-time, 3 = stay at home
envfuture	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	How much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements... “we worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree

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Table 2 – Continued from previous page

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
envprog	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	[as above] “People worry too much about human progress harming the environment”	5-point 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree
envharm	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	[as above] “Economic growth always harms the environment”	5-point 1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree
envhtax	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?	5-point 1 = very willing, 5 = very unwilling
envstd	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect the environment?	5-point 1 = very willing, 5 = very unwilling
envlaws	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	If you had to choose, which of the following would be closest to your views? “government should let ordinary people decide for themselves how to protect the environment, even if it means they don’t always do the right thing”, or “government should pass laws to make ordinary people protect the environment , even if it interferes with people’s rights to make their own decisions”	2-point 1 = second statement, 2 = first statement
envblaws	ISSP ENV	1993, 1990, 2010	[As above - substitute “businesses” for “ordinary people”]	2-point 1 = second statement, 2 = first statement
envtax1	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? “I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is used to prevent environmental pollution”	3-point 1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree
jobscarce	EVS	1990, 1999-00,	Do you disagree or agree with the	3-point

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Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
		2008-10	following statements: “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job= than women”	1 = disagree, 2 = agree
singparent1	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	[as above] “If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?”	3-point 1 = disagree, 2 = agree
workmoth1	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each: “A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work”	4-point 1 = agree strongly, 4=disagree strongly
hwincome	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	[as above] “Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income	4-point 1 = agree strongly, 4=disagree strongly
homosex	EVS	1981, 1990 1999-00, 2008-10	“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: “homosexuality”	10-point 1 = always justified, 10=never justified
abortion	EVS	as above	[as above] “Abortion”	as above
divorce	EVS	as above	[as above] “Divorce”	as above
euthan	EVS	as above	[as above] “Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)”	as above
potuse	EVS	as above	[as above] “Taking the drug marijuana or hashish”	as above
police	EVS	as above	How much confidence do you have in the police?	4-point 1=none at all, 4 = a great deal
police	EVS	as above	How much confidence do you have in the armed forces?	4-point 1=none at all, 4 = a great deal
stronggov	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	“It is important that the government is strong and ensures safety”	6-point top 3 responses indicate agreement

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Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
tradition	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	“It is important to try to follow the customs handed down by religion or family”	6-point top 3 responses indicate agreement
natenvt	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	“It is important to look after nature and the environment”	6-point top 3 responses indicate disagreement
gayrights	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	“To what extent do you agree or disagree that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their life as they wish?”	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
overthrow	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10	“To what extent do you agree or disagree that political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned?”	5-point 1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly
police1	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	How much do you personally trust the police?”	10-point 1=no trust at all, 10=complete trust
homosex1	PEW	2002, 07, 11, 13	“Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society”	2-point 1=agree, 2=disagree
engrowth	PEW	2002, 07, 08, 09, 10	“Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower growth and some loss of jobs”	4-point 1=completely agree, 4=completely disagree

Table 3: Variables included in the Immigration Model

Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
trads	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? “It is impossible for people who do not share this country’s customs and traditions to become fully	5-point 1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly

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Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
tradfunds	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	[nationality] [as above] "Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions"	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
immcrime	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	[as above] "Immigrants increase crime rates"	5-point 1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly
immecon	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	[as above] "Immigrants are generally good for this country's economy"	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
takejobs	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	[as above] "Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in this country."	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
immprove	ISSP NI	2003, 2013	[as above] "Immigrants improve this society by bringing in new ideas and cultures"	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
legalrights	ISSP NI	2003, 2013	[as above] "Legal immigrants to this country who are not citizens should have the same rights as citizens"	5-point 1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly
imports	ISSP NI	1995, 2003, 2013	[as above] "We should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect the national economy"	5-point 1=disagree strongly, 5=agree strongly
immgood	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10,12,14	Is it generally good or bad for the country's economy that people come to live here from other countries?	10-point 1=good, 10=bad
immcult	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10,12,14	Is the country's cultural life generally undermined or enriched by people come to live here?	10-point 1=enriched, 10=undermined
immsame	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10,12,14	To what extent do you think this country should allow people of the same race or ethnic group	4-point top 3 signal agreement

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Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
immdiff	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	as most of the country to come and live here?	4-point
immpoor	ESS	2002, 04, 06, 08, 10, 12, 14	[as above] ... different race or ethnic group?	top 3 signal agreement 4-point
scarceimm	EVS	1990, 1999-00, 2008-10	[as above] ... people from the poorer countries outside Europe?	top 3 signal agreement 3-point
concinms	EVS	1999-00, 2008-10	'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to native people over immigrants'	1=disagree, 3=agree 5-point
limitfors	EVS	1999-00, 2008-10	To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of immigrants in your country?	1=very much, 5=not at all 4-point
forinf	PEW	2002, 07, 09, 12	'Which one of the following do you think the government should do about people from less developed countries coming here to work?'	top 2: prohibit/place limits 4-point
socright	EB VAL	1997, 2000, 2003	'Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence'	1=completely disagree, 4=completely agree 2-point
sendump	EB VAL	1997, 2000, 2003	'Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as citizens.'	0=agree, 1=disagree 2-point
sendall	EB VAL	1997, 2000, 2003	'Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be sent back to their country of origin if they are unemployed.'	0=disagree, 1=agree 2-point
			'Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should all be sent back'	0=disagree, 1=agree

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Variable Name	Survey	Years Covered	Question Wording	Response Options
sendall	EB VAL	1997, 2000, 2003	to their country of origin' 'All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without exception'	2-point 0=disagree, 1=agree